US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement Sparks Debate Over Middle East Security

Washington: The United States recently signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, described by the US Department of Energy as historic. Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the Section 123 agreement under the Atomic Energy Act, supplemented by a bilateral safeguards agreement. Such agreements typically pave the way for American reactors, American nuclear fuel, and American oversight. However, the agreement has sparked a heated debate because it allegedly allows Saudi Arabia to independently enrich uranium on its own soil, according to several American media outlets.

According to TRTworld.com, this development has led to a sense of d©j  vu, as the region has seen similar scenarios before, though in different contexts. For nearly two decades, the international architecture surrounding Tehran’s nuclear program viewed Iran as a singular issue. However, the presence of Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and the security concerns of Gulf states have long existed, independent of the current tensions with Iran. The asymmetry in how nuclear enrichment programs are viewed in the region has led to accusations of selectivity in nonproliferation policies. The US-Saudi agreement, by potentially allowing uranium enrichment, has drawn significant criticism, with US President Donald Trump stating on Truth Social that “there will be no enrichment of materials,” despite contradictory reports suggesting otherwise.

Senator Ed Markey has introduced the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, requiring Riyadh to abandon uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing before the deal is finalized. Nonproliferation researcher Kelsey Davenport highlighted the dual nature of nuclear cooperation, which can either strengthen or undermine the nonproliferation regime, depending on the details. This situation presents a double standard, where sanctions and military actions were taken against one state for its enrichment program, while similar opportunities are considered for another state in the same region.

The agreement raises questions for Iran, as Saudi Arabia’s potential uranium enrichment program changes the strategic landscape in the Gulf. Riyadh’s defense treaty with nuclear-armed Pakistan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statements about developing nuclear weapons if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold add complexity to regional dynamics. The US-backed path to domestic enrichment, combined with existing defense alliances, makes the Saudi program a tangible concern for Iran.

The agreement also impacts other regional players, such as the UAE, which may seek to renegotiate its own nuclear deal with Washington if Saudi Arabia secures better terms. This could lead to a proliferation of fuel cycle capabilities as neighboring states demand equal terms. Turkey, with its longstanding civilian nuclear strategy, cannot ignore these developments, as they affect the regional balance of power.

In 2010, Turkey and Brazil attempted to broker a nuclear deal with Iran, emphasizing the right to peaceful nuclear technology and trust-building through verifiable exchanges. Although the deal was ultimately deemed insufficient by Washington and its partners, the logic of Turkey’s approach remains relevant. Regional nuclear crises are more dangerous when managed through unilateral pressure and unequal deals. A unified system, verifiable by all and perceived as fair, could provide a more resilient framework for managing regional tensions. Turkey’s past experiences offer valuable lessons as the Middle East navigates these complex nuclear dynamics.